Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing
Fricker coined the term epistemic injustice , the concept of an injustice done against someone "specifically in their capacity as a knower", and explored the concept in her book Epistemic Injustice. Fricker is most well known for her exploration of " epistemic injustice ," the act of wronging someone "in their capacity as a knower. She identifies two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Testimonial injustice consists in prejudices that cause one to "give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker's word":  Fricker gives the example of a woman who due to her gender is not believed in a business meeting. She may make a good case, but prejudice causes the listeners to believe her arguments to be less competent or sincere and thus less believable. In this kind of case, Fricker argues that as well as there being an injustice caused by possible outcomes such as the speaker missing a promotion at work , there is a testimonial injustice: "a kind of injustice in which someone is wronged specifically in her capacity as a knower ". Hermeneutical injustice is the kind of injustice experienced by groups who, because due to prejudice they have been less able to participate in the practices that generate new concepts e.
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Apart from the fictional example of Tom Robinson in To Kill a Mocking Bird , Miranda Fricker makes no explicit reference to the judiciary in this excellent and well argued book. But at least parts of it should be required reading for those involved with any system a central plank of which is the evaluation of testimony. Such evaluation, Fricker convincingly argues, is liable to specific kinds of injustice, testimonial injustice : speakers are denied the credibility their testimony deserves, because of the operation of prejudicial stereotypes which deflate the trustworthiness of members of certain social groups. As a consequence, those affected suffer harm both in their capacity as subjects of knowledge, as participating in the development and spread of knowledge, and also more Most users should sign in with their email address. If you originally registered with a username please use that to sign in.
E PI S T E M I C I N J U S T I C E This page intentionally left blank Epistemic Injustice Power and the Ethics of Knowing M IRAND A FRIC KE R 1 1 Great.
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Fler böcker av Miranda Fricker
Miranda Fricker's book Epistemic Injustice is an original and stimulating contribution to contemporary epistemology. Fricker's main aim is to illustrate the ethical aspects of two of our basic epistemic practices, namely conveying knowledge to others and making sense of our own social experiences. In particular, she wishes to investigate the idea that there are prevalent and distinctively epistemic forms of injustice related to these aspects of our epistemic lives, injustices which reflect the fact that our actual epistemic practices are socially situated. Most of the book focuses on two such forms — Testimonial Injustice and Hermeneutical Injustice — and on the epistemic virtues required to counteract them. Testimonial Injustice occurs when a hearer fails, because of prejudice, to give due credit to the word of a speaker
Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice. In epistemology, the very idea that there is a first-order ethical dimension to our epistemic practices — the idea that there is such a thing as epistemic justice — remains obscure until we adjust the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. This book argues that there is a distinctively epistemic genus of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower, wronged therefore in a capa This book argues that there is a distinctively epistemic genus of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower, wronged therefore in a capacity essential to human value. The book identifies two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice.